In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which is (...) sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Biological Sciences. (shrink)

Background: Funding organisations and research ethics committees should play a part in strengthening attention to gender equality in clinical research. In the research policy of European Union , funding measures have been taken to realise this, but such measures are lacking in the EU policy regarding RECs.Objective: To explore how RECs in Austria, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands and Sweden deal with gender equality issues by asking two questions: Do existing procedures promote representation of women and gender expertise in the committee? (...) How are sex and gender issues dealt with in protocol evaluation?Methods: Two RECs were selected from each country. Data were obtained through interviews with key informants and content analysis of relevant documents .Results: All countries have rules to ensure the presence of women on RECs; gender expertise is not required. Drug study protocols are carefully evaluated, sometimes on a formal basis, as regards the inclusion of women of childbearing age. The reason for excluding either one of the sexes or including specific groups of women or making a gender-specific risk–benefit analysis are investigated by some RECs. Such measures are, however, neither defined in the regulations nor integrated in review tools.Conclusions: The RECs investigated in five European member states are found to pay limited attention to gender equality in their working methods and, in particular in protocol evaluation. Policy and regulations of EU are needed to strengthen attention to gender equality in the work of RECs. (shrink)

En dépit de témoignages explicites d'auteurs anciens, auxquels des historiens modernes ont fait confiance, la date tardive du Phèdre ne fait plus de doute. Ce résultat est dû aux études stylistiques bien plus qu'aux travaux d'exégèse. Quand il s'agit de définir le sens et le but du dialogue ou de démêler les liens qui le rattachent aux autres dialogues ou à des écrits contemporains, on est loin d'aboutir à un accord. Platon veut-il simplement établir le programme d'une rhétorique philosophique pour (...) faire pièce à l'action envahissante des écoles de rhétorique ? Vise-t-il plus spécialement telle ou telle doctrine rhétorique ? Vu les points de contact avec des écrits d'Isocrate, d'Alcidamas et d'autres, a-t-il peut-être voulu trancher certaines questions brûlantes, intervenir en conciliateur ou en arbitre ? Le fait est que l'examen dialectique se termine à la p. 272b par la récapitulation et la réponse définitive à la question posée p. 258d et reprise p. 259e. Alors que le débat portait sur le logos en tant que discours écrit ou prononcé, Socrate introduit dans la finale la notion du logos de l'âme pour répondre aux objections de Phèdre. Alors qu'il a prouvé (261e-262b) la nécessité de la connaissance de la vérité, peu importe de quel genre de discours il s'agit, il revient en arrière pour discuter à nouveau la théorie de la vraisemblance de Tisias appliquée au seul genre judiciaire. Pourquoi, après chacune des objections (273d-274a, 278bc) répéter la conclusion finale et reprendre coup sur coup le problème de l'œuvre écrite, qu'il avait expédié en passant, p. 257d-258d ? Au terme de cette dernière diversion, Socrate oppose à la philosophie les techniques spéciales qui lui sont subordonnées : législation, poésie, éloquence. Est-ce peut-être dans ce message destiné à Lysias et doublé d'un message analogue à Isocrate que Platon a voulu nous donner la clef de l'œuvre ? Le Phèdre été conçu comme un drame parfait axé sur la mission et la condamnation de Socrate et cette structure lui donne son sens et son unité. Le cœur, c'est la péripétie et cette „reconnaissance” dans laquelle le daimonion ouvre les yeux de Socrate. Ecoutant son daimonion, il embrasse ses dieux à lui, son Eros, et dès lors sera traité d'impie par le jury. Les politiques, les poètes et les orateurs impuissants à appuyer leurs paroles (par la philosophie) (273c) deviendront ses accusateurs, et c'est Socrate qui, ignorant leur éloquence, sera impuissant à se défendre. On lui reprochera de corrompre la jeunesse. C'est que son discours ici se termine par cette prière significative : „Accorde-moi... d'être, plus encore qu'à présent, en crédit auprès des beaux garçons” (257a trad. Robin). Bref, la scène du Phèdre est le prélude, ou, si l'on veut, la contre-partie du drame de 399. Quel est le rôle de Lysias ? Exactement le même que dans la République et le Clitophon. Contrairement à son frère Polémarque (257b) il ne pense que politique et barreau, une politique qui en définitive adopte les principes de violence de Thrasymaque (Rép. I et Phèdre 266c). Dans une soi-disant Défense de Socrate, il a répondu à Polycrate en ramenant toute l'affaire sur le plan purement politique et en reniant le verdict de 399, imputable à l'absence d'une défense efficace. Soucieux du relèvement de la démocratie, il désire reléguer à l'arrière-plan l'affaire de 399, faire oublier les griefs religieux et peut-être tendre la main aux Socratiques, pour, ainsi, passer à l'ordre du jour. Or, se prêter à cette manoeuvre, pour Platon, c'est renier son maître. Que reproche-t-il à Lysias ? De tourner le dos à la Philosophie en médisant d'Eros. Et nous apprenons en finale, pour mettre fin à toute équivoque, qu'Isocrate n'échappe pas à ce même reproche. Mais tout cela se situe à l'arrière-plan. Dans la trame du Phèdre, celui qui est directement accusé d'impiété, celui qui s'accuse lui-même, c'est Socrate. S'il n'y avait vu clair, s'il avait quitté ce lieu sacré après un succès oratoire sur un thème imposé par Lysias, il aurait renié ses daimonia ; il aurait trouvé grâce auprès des hommes, mais serait justiciable des dieux (242d). Dans ce cas le drame, le vrai drame du Phèdre, n'aurait pas eu lieu et Socrate aurait échappé à son arrêt de mort. (shrink)

Le débat engagé dans le Phèdre à la suite des trois discours, constitue une enquête dialectique qui ne se limite pas, comme dans le Gorgias, aux seuls genres étudiés par les rhéteurs et sophistes, à savoir l'éloquence du barreau et de la tribune politique. Il examine toute la rhétorique en tant qu'art de conduire ou de provoquer l'âme. Tout discours, à quelque genre qu'il appartienne, est sujet à contradiction : en rhétorique comme en dialectique celui-là est le meilleur qui voit (...) la vérité, parce que, connaissant le pour et le contre, le vrai et le semblant de vérité, il saura défendre l'une et l'autre thèse. C'est là une doctrine reçue dans l'Académie. Pour la mettre en évidence Platon a recours à l'exemple des trois discours. Celui de Lysias, faute d'avoir établi une définition qui en soit le principe ou commencement, manque de suite et „nage à rebours". Les deux discours de Socrate posent un principe. Dans le premier une définition conventionnelle de l'amour le conduit à blâmer celui-ci, à juste titre. Vrai en lui-même, ce discours devient faux du moment qu'on lève la convention : or, dans le cas présent, il faut la lever, parce qu'elle méconnaît le divin. Sur l'intervention du „ signe" avertisseur, Socrate le corrige et le complète par le second discours, dont le principe n'est plus conventionnel et hypothétique, mais absolu : l'âme, principe moteur de tout. Nous avons ici l'antilogie parfaite qui repose sur l'unité de formes opposées, „l'un qui s'épand en multiplicité". Platon a choisi comme sujet l'amour parce que c'est lui qui, en tant qu'intermédiaire, unissant l'humain et le divin, réalise éminemment cette unité-multiplicité. L'exposé de la méthode diérétique contient bien des éléments que nous retrouverons dans les dialogues métaphysiques, mais nous aurions tort de la confondre avec celle du Sophiste, qui opère sur des notions „humaines" et a comme but de définir la forme indivisible en la cernant par une chaîne de divisions dichotomiques. Ici, grâce au mythe, il opère la jonction avec le trancendant, et il prouve que, par son caractère antilogique, le discours complet correspond à la structure de l'être un et multiple en affirmant l'unité et la contrariété des formes non-homonymes qui la constituent. Ce ne sont donc pas des exercices de dialectique formelle opérant sur de purs concepts. L'unité en question est réalisée dans l'ordre transcendant des Idées et c'est la réminiscence qui nous permet de la saisir et de reconnaître ainsi les rapports logiques et ontologiques à la fois entre les choses perçues. Cette méthode, nous devons la suivre „ pour être à même de parler et de penser". En fondant la rhétorique sur la dialectique, Platon entend reléguer au second plan les facteurs émotionnels que, sous l'influence du théâtre, la rhétorique attique d'inspiration Gorgienne avait mis en évidence comme constituant l'essence de la rhétorique. Après avoir, ici, revendiqué pour la dialectique la place qui lui revient, Socrate nous dira dans la suite ce que valent ces moyens et quel parti on peut en tirer. Il importe de bien distinguer ces deux thèses, comme Platon a eu soin de le faire. La première nous renvoie à la dialectique, la seconde à la philosophie de la nature. (shrink)

This volume is a Festschrift dedicated to Charles Kahn comprised of more than 20 papers presented at the conference "Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift Symposium in Honor of Charles Kahn", 3-7 June 2009. The conference was held at the European Cultural Center of Delphi, Greece, and was organized and sponsored by the HYELE Institute for Comparative Studies and Parmenides Publishing, with endorsement from the International Plato Society, and the Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania. Contributors: Julia (...) Annas - University of Arizona; Sarah Broadie - University of St. Andrews; Lesley Brown - University of Oxford; Tomás Calvo-Martínez - Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Diskin Clay - Duke University; John M. Dillon - Trinity College, Dublin; Dorothea Frede - Humbolt University, Berlin; Arnold Hermann - HYELE Institute for Comparative Studies; Carl A. Huffman - DePauw University; Enrique Hülsz Piccone - Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico; D.M. Hutchinson - St. Olaf College; Paul Kalligas - National and Kapodistrian University, Athens; Vassilis Karasmanis - National Technical University, Athens; Aryeh Kosman - Haverford College; Anthony A. Long - University of California, Berkeley; Richard McKirahan - Pomona College; Susan Sauvé Meyer - University of Pennsylvania; Alexander P.D. Mourelatos - University of Texas at Austin; Satoshi Ogihara - Tohoku University, Japan; Richard Patterson - Emory University; Christopher J. Rowe - Durham University; David Sedley - University of Cambridge; Richard Sorabji - University of Oxford. (shrink)

[D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the tensed nature (...) of time. Nor are McTaggart' s difficulties due to the tensed nature of time. The ego-centricity of tensed discourse is an essential feature of communication between selves, each of whom refers himself as 'I', and is required for talking about time as well as experience and agency. Arguments based on the Special Theory are misconceived. Some rest on a confused notion of 'topological simultaneity'. In the General Theory a cosmic time is defined, as also in quantum mechanics, where a natural present is defined by a unique hyperplane of collapse into eigen-ness. (shrink)

This article is the text of an interview with D. H. Mellor conducted by Andrew Pyle and first published in the Spring 1993 issue of the philosophical journal Cogito.

Everything we do relies on causation. We eat and drink because this causes us to stay alive. Courts tell us who causes crimes, criminology tell us what causes people to commit them. D.H. Mellor shows us that to understand the world and our lives we must understand causation. _The Facts of Causation_, now available in paperback, is essential reading for students and for anyone interested in reading one of the ground-breaking theories in metaphysics. We cannot understand the world and our (...) place in it without understanding causation. Yet a complete account of the nature and implications of causation does not exist. D.H Mellor's new book is that account. (shrink)

This is a study of the nature of time. In it, redeploying an argument first presented by McTaggart, the author argues that although time itself is real, tense is not. He accounts for the appearance of the reality of tense - our sense of the passage of time, and the fact that our experience occurs in the present - by showing how time is indispensable as a condition of action. Time itself is further analysed, and Dr Mellor gives answers to (...) most of the metaphysical questions it provokes, concerning the relation of time to space, the dissection of time, and its relation to change and causation. (shrink)

_Probability: A Philosophical Introduction_ introduces and explains the principal concepts and applications of probability. It is intended for philosophers and others who want to understand probability as we all apply it in our working and everyday lives. The book is not a course in mathematical probability, of which it uses only the simplest results, and avoids all needless technicality. The role of probability in modern theories of knowledge, inference, induction, causation, laws of nature, action and decision-making makes an understanding of (...) it especially important to philosophers and students of philosophy, to whom this book will be invaluable both as a textbook and a work of reference. In this book D. H. Mellor discusses the three basic kinds of probability – physical, epistemic, and subjective – and introduces and assesses the main theories and interpretations of them. The topics and concepts covered include: * chance * frequency * possibility * propensity * credence * confirmation * Bayesianism. _Probability: A Philosophical Introduction_ is essential reading for all philosophy students and others who encounter or need to apply ideas of probability. (shrink)

D. H. Mellor; VI*—Conscious Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 87–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.

This book deals not so much with statistical methods as with the central concept of chance, or statistical probability, which statistical theories apply to nature.

This selection of D. H. Mellor's work demonstrates the wide ranging originality of his work. It gathers together sixteen major papers on related topics. Together they form a complete modern metaphysics. The first five papers are on aspects of the mind: on our 'selves', their supposed subjectivity and how we refer to them, on the nature of conscious belief and on computational and physicalist theories of the mind. The next five papers deal with dispositions, natural kinds, laws of nature and (...) how they involve natural necessity, universals and objective chances, and the relation between properties and predicates. Then follow three papers about the relations between time, change and causation, the nature of individual causes and effects and of the causal relation between them, and how causation depends on chance. The last three papers discuss the relation between chance and degrees of belief, give a solution to the problem of induction, and argue for an objective interpretation of decision theory. (shrink)

D. H. Mellor; I *—The Presidential Address: Nothing Like Experience, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 1–16, https.

The paper looks at the semantics and ontology of dispositions in the light of recent work on the subject. Objections to the simple conditionals apparently entailed by disposition statements are met by replacing them with so-called 'reduction sentences' and some implications of this are explored. The usual distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is criticised and the relation between dispositions and their bases examined. Applying this discussion to two typical cases leads to the conclusion that fragility is not a real (...) property and that, while both temperature and its bases are, this does not generate any problem of overdetermination. (shrink)

Mind, Meaning, and Reality presents fifteen philosophical papers in which D. H. Mellor explores some of the most intriguing questions in philosophy. These include: what determines what we think, and what we use language to mean; how that depends on what there is in the world and why there is only one universe; and the nature of time.

D. H. Mellor; VI*—I and Now, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 79–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/89.1.79.

How does the study of society relate to the study of the people it comprises? This longstanding question is partly one of method, but mainly one of fact, of how independent the objects of these two studies, societies and people, are. It is commonly put as a question of reduction, and I shall tackle it in that form: does sociology reduce in principle to individual psychology? I follow custom in calling the claim that it does ‘individualism’ and its denial ‘holism’.

Professor Monro presents an original view of ethics based on empiricism, which leads him to a subjectivist position about moral values. He starts by examining the central problem in moral philosophy: are moral statements objectively true, or are they expressions of preference? The first view conflicts with the empiricist beliefs current in modern thought; the opposing naturalistic theory seems to lead to moral scepticism. After discussing both views, the author presents a detailed defence of the subjectivist position. In the course (...) of his argument he gives a detailed analysis and criticism of the 'universalisability thesis', the theory that moral aspirations differ from others in being applicable to all men, and that it is this that makes them moral. He then offers an alternative account of the nature of moral attitudes. The author illustrates his explanations with straightforward analogies and examples. His clear exposition of the fundamental concepts arising in his argument makes this a book for students as well as for professional moral philosophers. (shrink)

I show that the connotations of causation - temporal, explanatory, predictive and means-end - are preserved in indeterministic causation only to the extent that effects have a greater chance of occurring in the circumstances if their causes do than if they don’t.

The paper argues that very different part-whole relations hold between different kinds of entities. While these relations share most of their formal properties, they need not share all of them. Nor need other mereological principles be true of all kinds of part–whole pairs. In particular, it is argued that the principle of unrestricted composition, that any two or more entities have a mereological sum, while true of sets and propositions, is false of things and events.

Entities of many kinds, not just material things, have been credited with parts. Armstrong , for example, has taken propositions and properties to be parts of their conjunctions, sets to be parts of sets that include them, and geographical regions and events to be parts of regions and events that contain them. The justification for bringing all these diverse relations under a single ‘part–whole’ concept is that they share all or most of the formal features articulated in mereology . But (...) the concept has also prompted an ontological thesis that has been expressed in various ways: that wholes are ‘no ontological addition’ to their parts ; that to list both a whole and its parts is ‘double counting’; and that there is ‘no more’ to a whole than its parts: for example, that there is no more to a conjunction than the conjuncts that are its parts, and whose truth or falsity determines whether it is true or false. For brevity, I shall express the thesis in the last of these ways, as the claim that entities with parts are ‘nothing but’ those parts. (shrink)